Graphics processing units (GPUs) are moving towards supporting concurrent kernel execution where multiple kernels may be co-executed on the same GPU and even on the same streaming multiprocessor (SM) core. While concurrent kernel execution improves hardware resource utilization, it opens up vulnerabilities to covert-channel and side-channel attacks. These attacks exploit information leakage across kernels that results from contention on shared resources; they have been shown to be a dangerous threat on CPUs, and are starting to be demonstrated on GPUs. The unique micro-architectural features of GPUs, such as specialized cache structures and massive parallel thread support, create opportunities for GPU-speciic channels to be formed. In this paper, we propose GPUGuard, a decision tree based detection and a hierarchical defense framework that can reliably close the covert channels. Our results show that GPUGuard can detect contention with 100% sensitivity and a small (8.5%) false positive rate. The timing channels are mitigated through Tangram, a GPU-speciic contention channel elimination scheme, with only 8% to 23% overhead when there is an attack and zero performance overhead when no attacks are detected. Compared to temporal partitioning, GPUGuard is 69%-96% faster in various architectures even when active, showing that it is possible to gain substantial performance from executing concurrent kernels on a single SM while securing GPUs against these attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Microarchirectural covert and side channels are a dangerous threat vector that allows leakage of sensitive information from otherwise secure implementations of applications and systems. Many CPU microarchitectural structures such as caches [28, 39, 53] and branch predictor units [16, 17] have been shown to be viable vectors for such attacks. Speculation based attacks such as the recent Meltdown [36] and Spectre [30] also rely critically on the presence of covert channels. These attacks continue to be a substantial threat, and an active area of research on CPUs. A number of defenses and mitigations have been investigated to protect CPU structures against these attacks [15, 27, 37, 38, 50, 65] .
Recent work has started to demonstrate that GPUs are also vulnerable to microarchitectural covert and side-channel attacks. GPU manufacturers are ofering increasing support for multiprogramming on GPUs to fully utilize the growing resource availability in GPU ś wider data paths and more streaming multiprocessors (SMs). GPUs are now ofered as a resource in cloud computing systems. A malicious VM can now spy on other applications that share a GPU (a side channel attack) or collude with another to covertly communicate sensitive information to bypass information isolation boundaries. Jiang et al. [24] have demonstrated timing attack on GPUs that relies on data dependent kernel execution time variations that occur due to memory coalescing behavior. Naghibijouybari et al. demonstrated the presence of high bandwidth covert channels [45] , as well as side channels on GPUs [46] .
In this work, our goal is to provide a comprehensive solution to mitigate contention based covert-and side-channel attacks between two kernels co-executing on a GPU. At the core of these attacks an adversary/spy exploits contention in hardware resources to indirectly infer information about a victim kernel in the case of side channel attacks, or a colluding trojan kernel in the case of covert channel attacks. While solutions for such attacks in CPUs have been proposed, GPUs have a substantially diferent execution model with massive parallelism, internal hardware schedulers that impact colocation and contention, as well as several unique (micro)architectural structures such as constant cache, which provide a varied range of paths for contention based channel formation.
Our attack detection relies on the increased resource contention that is exhibited when a GPU is facing a covert or side-channel attack. In the context of CPUs, Hunger et al. have already shown that resource contention is one of the most quantiiable impact of an attack [20] . As such, GPUGuard non-intrusively monitors resource contention across kernels through a set of well deined features and resource utilization metrics. It then uses these features and metrics to classify kernel interaction behaviors, and to identify covert and side-channel formation. Once an attack is identiied, the second component of our solution separates contending kernels into separate security domains, uniquely possible in GPUs due to the inherent spatial parallelism available, to close the identiied contention channels. We use security domains at diferent hierarchy levels to maximize sharing (and performance) when it is safe, but to close contention based channels when there is a possibility for the existence of such a channel.
One simple solution to mitigate any information leakage through shared resources is to temporally partition the resources. But it has been shown in many recent studies that GPUs beneit greatly from ine-grain sharing, including intra-SM sharing [13, 51, 66, 67, 70] . As we show in Section 7, temporal partitioning alone results in nearly 2X performance penalty compared to our proposed scheme.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose GPUGuard a new framework for defending GPUs from contention based covert and side channels. • We evaluate GPUGuard on 250 covert-channel attacks running on their own or in combination with benign GPU workloads. We also reimplement one of the recent GPU side channel attacks, proposed by Naghibijouybari et al. [46] and show that we are able to detect it and mitigate it. To the best of our knowledge, our mitigation framework is the irst proposal for defending against contention-based covert and side channel attacks on GPUs. • GPUGuard proposes a novel spatial partitioning of resources to guard against covert and side channels formed by contention on intra-SM shared resources, such as execution units, L1 cache, warp scheduler, and instruction fetch units. For attacks formed through L2 cache and atomic memory accesses GPUGuard proposes to fall back on temporal partitioning of resources. GPUGuard in its current form does not protect against channels formed through the following resources: shared memory, SIMT stacks, and register iles. • Our solution is able to detect these channel attacks with 93% accuracy in our benchmarks. The defense scheme reliably closes contention channels by isolating kernels through a hierarchy of resource partitioning approaches. • Compared to an insecure baseline that simply ignores such channels, GPUGuard pays 8%-28% performance penalty only when actively eliminating any identiied channels. On the other hand, when there are no active channels GPUGuard has little performance overhead, as the cost of monitoring contention and classifying the kernel behaviors is negligible. Compared to a baseline that uses temporal partitioning that prohibits concurrent kernel execution to eliminate channels, GPUGuard has 1.69X-1.96X better performance.
WHY CONSIDER GPU CHANNELS
It is not surprising that to date most of the covert and side channel attacks have been demonstrated on CPUs. GPUs have mostly been spared from such attacks primarily because until recently they had limited (or even no) support for concurrent kernel execution which leads to resource contention. But that limitation is rapidly being relaxed. For example, AMD multiuser GPUs [3] and NVIDIA vG-PUs [2] both enable up to 16 concurrent clients to share a GPU. NVIDIA GPUs support asynchronous compute to concurrently run graphics and general purpose workloads since Maxwell [1] . The Volta multi-process service [5] features spatially sharing a GPU among multiple applications. Intra-SM concurrent kernel execution [13, 51, 66, 67, 70] further enables iner-grain sharing within a single SM to improve overall GPU utilization. Furthermore, GPUs are now being deployed in a virtualized cloud environment such as the Google Cloud [18] , Amazon AWS cloud [7] and Microsoft Azure [42] . Both covert [45] and side channel [46] attacks between unprivileged applications based on contention have recently been demonstrated on GPUs. In this environment it is only a matter of time before GPU execution model will be compromised through covert and side-channel exploitation. Hence, we believe it is vital to tackle this challenge now and GPUGuard serves that purpose.
Baseline GPU Architecture
Each GPU kernel contains several cooperative thread arrays (CTA) or thread blocks, with each CTA sub-divided into groups of threads called a warp in the NVIDIA terminology or a wavefront in the AMD terminology. For simplicity, we use NVIDIA terminology throughout the paper. Figure 1 shows our baseline GPU consisting of several SMs, connected to global memory partitions through interconnection networks. Each SM comprises vast set of execution resources such as ALUs, registers, caches (both specialized caches such as constant caches and texture caches and regular data caches), and shared memory. L2 cache and global memory are accessible to multiple kernels running on diferent SMs. Modern GPUs [5, 19] allow multiple kernels to share an SM. Hence even intra-SM resources such as L1 caches, integer and loating point execution units, special function units, load/store units, instruction fetch units, and warp schedulers are shared across kernels within each SM. While multiple recent studies focused on the efectiveness of sharing resources across concurrent kernels [6, 67, 70] , related GPU security concerns are not well studied. Concurrent kernels running on the same SM, possibly belonging to diferent processes, share GPU resources at a ine granularity. Thus, it becomes possible to exploit indirect information low through the shared microarchitecture structures to conduct covert or side channel attacks.
Threat Model: Covert and Side Channel Attacks on GPUs
We consider two threat models: covert channel and side channel attacks. For a covert channel attack we assume two colluding kernels that concurrently share the same GPU and desire to communicate sensitive data across protection boundaries. Contention channels exploit diferences in observed behavior caused by the presence or absence of contention on microarchitectural resources. They are able to measure contention by timing their operations, or by inspecting the hardware performance counters which are available in user mode in the current generation of GPU drivers [46] . In a side channel attack context, one kernel (the attacker) is observing contention to infer secret information about a victim if its resource access pattern is dependent on sensitive data. As an example covert channel scenario, a Trojan application can create contention on shared resource by replacing the contents of a cache set to encode '1' and leave the resource idle to encode '0'. The Spy application, on the other side accesses the cache and measures its access time to decode the transferred bit. Similarly, a Trojan application can create contention by excessively using execution units, warp scheduler, and instruction fetch units to encode '1' and leave those resource idle to encode '0', which spy can then decode.
GPUGUARD KEY IDEA: HIERARCHICAL SECURITY DOMAINS
We propose GPUGuard, a holistic protection framework for GPUs to detect and defend against contention-based attacks. Figure 3a presents an illustrative example of GPUGuard. In this example, we assume that there are four applications concurrently running on the GPU, including two regular applications, a Trojan application, and a Spy application. Each application launches kernels to the shared GPU, which may be assigned to execute on the same SM. A GPUGuard classiier is designed to detect collusion between two kernels. Our defense mechanism will reschedule the suspected kernels into isolated security domains. For example, in Figure 3a , the GPUGuard identiied that Kernel 3 and 4 are suspicious. The GPU now creates three isolated security domains (SD1-3) and issues Kernel 1 and 2 to SD1, Kernel 3 to SD2, and Kernel 4 to SD3. In this way, the timing channel between Kernel 3 and 4 is closed.
Security Domains
It is critical to deine the scope of a security domain to minimize the performance overheads. Rather than using a one-size-its-all approach GPUGuard uses a hierarchy of security domains with varying scopes. Depending on the type of attack detected GPUG-Guard employs a security domain that encompasses only those resources that are being used in channel formation. GPUs rely on kernel level preemption (essentially context switches) to enforce temporal partitioning: when K1 reaches the end of its assigned slot, the GPU needs to save the kernel context, preempt the kernel and then schedule the next kernel K2 to run on the GPU. After K2 uses up its time slot, K1 must reload its context and then resume execution. Context switching on GPUs is more expensive than on CPUs [52, 66] . On the Pascal architecture which supports optimized preemption, kernel preemption takes 100 micro seconds ś a 100K cycle penalty even when using a 1GHz GPU. Thus temporal partitioning alone is an expensive solution for providing isolation.
Finer-Grain security domains using spatial partitioning. The next level of isolation can be achieved through a hierarchy of spatial partitioning approaches. Adriaens et al. proposed spatial partitioning at the granularity of SM to partition GPU resources across multiple kernels, primarily to improve resource utilization [6] . This technique can be easily adapted to create multiple security domains on the same GPU. Figure 2b shows an example with 16 SMs and with spatial partitioning the Trojan kernel K1 occupies SMs 0-7 while the Spy kernel K2 occupies SMs 8-15. Because the kernels are separated on diferent SMs, no contention can be established through intra-SM resources, such as execution units or L1 caches. However, spatial partitioning at the granularity of an SM does not protect against attacks through globally shared resources such as the L2 cache, memory channels, and interconnection network.
Spatial partitioning is a heavy handed solution: the entire resources are strictly partitioned leading to signiicant performance hit when there are no attacks. A iner grain isolation can be provided using intra-SM partitioning. It has been demonstrated that sharing a single SM (intra-SM sharing) across multiple kernels can provide higher system throughput and better utilization of GPU resources compared to spatial partitioning [13, 66, 67, 70] . Hence, we argue in this work that the beneits of intra-SM sharing must be delivered to the end user, without compromising the potential security risks.
Putting it all together. Figure 3b summarizes how GPUGuard may use both temporal and spatial partitioning at various granularities to achieve the required isolation with minimum performance Figure 3 : An illustrative example of a GPU system with GPUGuard (a) monitor and detect timing attacks; (b) select a security domain level based on speciic attack type (our contributions are highlighted) overhead. As shown in Figure 3b , we can partition the four SMs into two security domain SD1 and SD2, each containing two SMs. GPUGuard may also use intra-SM partitioning of parallel execution lanes or utilizing other underutilized resources inside an SM to create multiple security domains. For example, assuming that there are four execution lanes in the special functional units inside an SM, GPUGuard can assign the irst two lanes to SD1 and the remaining two lanes to SD2. This partitioning can be achieved through security aware warp folding which we will introduce shortly. Note that many GPU workloads have shown signiicant warp level divergence [22, 69] , and lane level partitioning in many cases improves the resource utilization. Through this hierarchy GPUGuard activates the right amount of isolation for preventing collusion while still maximizing the beneits of ine-grain intra-SM resource sharing across kernels.
ATTACK TYPES 4.1 Description of Typical Attacks
We assume a conventional covert communication scenario with a Trojan and Spy kernels from two diferent applications that are coexecuting on the same GPU and wish to communicate covertly. The attack benchmarks we used in this paper are intra-SM and inter-SM microarchitectural covert channels on GPUs, categorized into ive groups modeled on recently published attacks [45] and summarized in Table 1 . These ive types of attacks have been demonstrated to occur in current generation GPUs and hence we chose to tackle these ive attacks. Based on current generation GPU microarchitectural details that are publicly known, we believe these ive attacks cover a wide range of information leakage through shared resources.
In our experiments, we couldn't reliably measure timing variance through shared memory bank conlicts to construct a covert communication, hence, we do not consider such attacks in this work. This is also justiied by Naghibijouybari et al. [45] , who observed łlittle measurable efect in the timing of a competing kernelž. We surmise it is because of the uncertainty in shared memory bank conlicts. It is possible with careful reverse engineering that such an attack can be constructed, but we will leave it for future work. We also do not directly address L2 cache attacks in this paper, where the L2 cache may be shared across multiple SMs. In this case we believe that GPUGuard can simply switch to coarse grain temporal partitioning to mitigate L2 cache attacks. Finally, we believe that our decision tree classiication approach is general enough to tackle new intra-SM attacks by including such attacks into the training set to retrain the classiier and reprogram the detection units. [45] . L1 Cache Attack: Trojan accesses one or multiple cache set(s) to send "1" and Spy accesses the same set(s) and measures the access time. Attacks can target L1 constant, instruction, data or texture caches. Execution Unit Attack: Trojan threads do a number of double or single precision ops to create contention on INT/FP units to send "1". Spy threads do the same ops and measure the execution time. SFU Attack: Trojan threads do a number of special function operations (like __sinf) to create contention on SFUs to send "1". Spy threads do the same operations and measure the execution time. Scheduler Attack: These are timing channels created as a side efect of a primary EU and SFU attack, typically leaking information by observing warp scheduler contention. Atomic Attack: Trojan threads do atomic ops on global memory addresses (one particular address or strided addresses to achieve coalesced or uncoalesced accesses) to send "1". Spy accesses the same pattern and measures the access time. **In all attack scenarios, high measured latency by the Spy is decoded as "1" and low latency is decoded as "0".
Attack Detection
To detect such covert channel attacks, GPUGuard continuously monitors the activation and resource usages of running kernels. GPUGuard employs a decision tree classiier that reads readily available performance counter metrics to track kernel behaviours and identify suspicious contentions. We elected to use decision tree, a machine learning model, as it is robust to noise that can fool deterministic threshold based detectors.
The attack detector continuously monitors the execution status, resource utilization and various other performance counters (e.g. cache miss rates) for diferent active kernels. A selection of features is extracted periodically (once every 1000 cycles in our setup) from the collected performance counter statistics and are used by a machine learning classiier to detect whether there are suspect timing channels between any two concurrent kernels. The output of the classiier is a label we assigned to diferent attacks and normal application. We develop a multi-class classiier that not only detects suspected timing channel presence, but also determines the target shared resources that are used to communicate covertly.
Decision Tree Classiier. Without loss of generality, we use a decision tree based classiication algorithm to classify the attack type. Decision trees are a supervised learning algorithm in which the classiication model is built by breaking down a dataset into progressively smaller subsets based on a feature value at every decision point. This classiication may be viewed as a tree structure where each level progressively reines the classiication of an input. The two most important advantages of decision trees over other classiication models are: (1) small hardware overhead (see Section 7.4); and (2) direct isolation of relevant feature elements through an estimate of information gain. We use the ID3 algorithm to build the tree [54] , which uses entropy and information gain to identify appropriate decision points, and employs a top-down greedy search through the space of possible branches with no backtracking. Once the tree is constructed based on the training data, a new instance is classiied by starting at the root node of the tree, testing the attributes (or feature elements) speciied by this node, then moving down the tree branch corresponding to the value of the attribute. This process is then repeated to reach a leaf node [43] .
As with any classiication algorithm there are two issues that we must address. First, the classiier may have both false-positive and false-negative classiications. We show later in our results that 0% of the malicious kernels were classiied as benign and only 8% of benign kernels were classiied as malign. Hence, we believe misclassiication is not a concern. The second challenge is that an attacker may design Trojan/Spy pairs that continuously shifts between benign behavior and malicious behavior that may cause the decision tree to lower its threshold. But to alter such a behavior the attacker must irst observe the information leakage to adapt, but such covert channel bandwidth is going to be drastically reduced in the irst place using GPUGuard. Hence, the time to adapt will be extended signiicantly which we believe is the primary deterrent in covert and side-channel attacks.
Feature Selection. The decision tree model is built using a training input set consisting a large collection of features that correspond to various resource utilization indicators, covering diferent types of covert channels. Table 2 lists all the features that were collected as inputs for the decision tree model.
The feature vectors were divided based on whether they came from the training or testing data set benchmarks. The data in each of the sets was obtained from running the benchmarks and attacks that belong to that set only. The decision tree model is trained using the training input set. Once the training is complete, we obtain the decision tree model parameters which include the weight of each of the features in determining the attack type. We then optimize the tree by pruning unimportant features. To identify the most important feature elements, we use the decision tree model for multiclass classiication to compute the importance factor of each feature element based on the training subset. Through this selection, we were able to reduce the 234 features to a set of 24 that are identiied as the most important features. As a result our trained decision tree classiier takes as input a select set of microarchitecture features collected at runtime, which are listed in bold font in Table 2 .
Pruning the feature set allows us to reduce the complexity of the classiier, without sacriicing detection accuracy. The identiied important features are related to the resources that are used by our attack benchmarks to create contention; intuitively, the decision tree checks the utilization of each resource to identify the presence and type of contention. We then classify the test set based on our decision tree model using two-fold cross validation. Section 7 evaluates the accuracy of our online detection, based on classiication results for each instance in the test set.
Feature Collection. The 24 selected features are sampled for each active kernel periodically (every 1000 cycles) and then fed to the classiier. An efective online detector needs to ilter out occasional false classiications and quickly signal true malicious behavior. Ozsoy et al. [49] adopted an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) approach for their binary classiication. For the same reason, we design a voting algorithm that irst considers classiication results from the decision tree classiier (making the time-series consist of 0's for benign application and 1-5's for ive attack types.) We then use a window of 10 of these decisions and pick the majority decision as the correct answer and output whether an attack is in progress and, if so, which of the ive attack types is being used. Synthesis results show that the extra hardware overhead of the classiier is not high (shown in Section 7.4).
Detector Adaptation. Although we believe the attacks in our training set cover exploitable shared resources, if in the future new contention channels are encountered due to microarchitectural enhancements to SMs, they can be addressed by retraining the model with new training data. Since classiication is implemented in hardware we need to provide the ability to adapt the detector at runtime if new attack vectors are identiied during in-ield operation. To make this adjustment feasible we expect the boot loader to essentially re-program the node weights in the tree, which are implemented using registers.
TANGRAM: ATTACK MITIGATION
The second component of GPUGuard is a defense against covert channel attacks once an attack is detected. We refer to the GPU-Guard's defense mechanism alone as the Tangram (shown in Figure 4) . Tangram uses a hierarchy of resource slicing to prevent the attack types that are detected. The approach to partition resources is similar to a dissection puzzle called Tangram. Tangram uses hierarchical security domains to separate colluding kernels, starting with ine grain intra-SM slicing and then gradually moving towards coarser-grain inter-SM slicing, depending on the attack type. In particular, GPUGuard uses intra-SM spatial partitioning of resources to mitigate L1 cache attack, execution unit, and SFU attacks. For Atomic attack, GPUGuard uses temporal partitioning. The only partitioning that is not used in GPUGuard is partitioning of SMs into clusters of security domains, since all attacks can be mitigated with either intra-SM spatial partitioning or temporal partitioning.
As shown in Figure 4 , and described in more details below, security domain are created using sliced data pipelines ( 1 ), controlled memory request traic within memory units ( 2 ), rate limited scheduling in the warp scheduler ( 3 ), and L1 fetch arbiter ( 4 ).
The maximum number of security domains for each resource is set as four. Hence, at most four suspicious kernels can be isolated in a given SM. This is a reasonable limitation since more than four concurrent kernels inside the same SM have diminishing returns in performance beneits [66] .
Mitigating Execution Units and SFU Attack: Datapath Slicing. As in our baseline GPU, we assume 32 execution lanes within a single SM. Datapath slicing splits the 32 execution lanes into four slices, each with eight lanes. Note that GPUs already treat the 32 execution lanes as a collection of clustered lanes that are operated semi-independently of others. For instance, AMD's subwarp execution model allows multiple warps to share the same set of datapaths.
No matter if they are from diferent kernels or protection domains subwarp execution requires the same control logic for each of the sub datapaths.
GPUGuard relies on the subwarp execution model where each slice is allocated to a single kernel thereby preventing one kernel from observing the SFU and execution unit usage of another kernel. Note that datapath slicing does not change the number of threads inside a warp or the number of register ile banks in the SM. Datapath slicing folds the 32 threads in a warp into four quarter-warps, which are then issued in succession. The threads in a warp are shifted in successive cycles to align with the slice in a linear fashion: threads 0-7 are mapped to lane 0-7 in the irst cycle, threads 8-15 are mapped to lane 0-7 in the second cycle, and so on. Datapath slicing allows for concurrent warps from diferent security domains to be executed simultaneously on isolated datapath slices. With four slices each warp executing on a slice needs to be executed in four consecutive cycles, incurring a three cycle delay for a given warp. While a sliced pipeline delays the execution of each warp, the total throughput of the GPU is similar to, or in some cases even better than, a uniied 32-lane pipeline. When there are control divergence, a sliced pipeline can help ill out the idle resources more efectively and improves the performance.
Tangram relies on some additional hardware support for executing multiple sub-warps concurrently. Tangram adds a set of 32 registers immediately before and after each data pipeline slice (shown in Figure 4) , so that the registers can be consumed and updated in multiple successive cycles. However, the proposed design does not require any modiication to the interconnection network between the register banks and the data pipeline. The interconnection still forwards the registers into the same original 32-wide registers of the pipeline. Then a 1-to-4 channel de-multiplexer is added to shift the register to the add-on 32-wide register of a particular slice. The write-back process follows a similar path: the results of a slice will be stored locally in the add-on registers and shifted out to the original 32-wide write-back register through the 4-to-1 channel multiplexer. After each sub-warp inishes, the caching register shifts left by 8 words to feed into the next sub-warp.
Cache partitioning is a reasonable mechanism in CPUs to create separation and remove contention channels. Since GPUs have multiple cache types, we use a novel cache redirection approach instead of partitioning. To mitigate covert channels from constant cache accesses, Tangram dynamically re-routes traic from constant cache to use the L1-D cache. For this purpose, Tangram relies on the decision tree classiier to categorize the attack type as the constant data cache attack, and in which case the constant values accessed by one malicious kernel are moved to the L1-D cache. Once an attack is detected, Tangram monitors constant data load operations from one of the malicious kernel. The load address is irst looked up in the constant cache. If there is a hit in the constant cache, Tangram marks it as a miss and evicts the data from constant cache and places a miss ill request to bring the data back into the L1-D cache. For this purpose, Tangram uses the constant data address to lookup the L1D cache to ind a victim cache line. The victim cache line is evicted and constant data is then stored in that line. Thus, the channel through the constant cache is eliminated. If the attacker detects the protection and then changes to use L1 data cache, Tangram will eliminate the covert channel formed through L1 data cache using cache bypassing. Previous studies show that the GPU L1D cache miss rate is so high so that the performance is not harmed when the GPU L1-D cache is bypassed [11, 23, 34, 35, 61, 68] . Therefore, Tangram selectively bypasses the L1-D cache requests if the attacks are detected on the L1D cache instead. Since it is not possible to re-purpose the read-only constant cache for potentially read/write operations from a regular L1-D cache, our approach simply picks either the Spy or Trojan kernel and mark all its load/store operations as non-cacheable.
Mitigating Scheduler Attacks. When a kernel modulates Execution Units/SFU/Cache accesses, in addition to the contention on one speciic unit, the attack often creates weaker side attack contention on other shared resources, including shared warp scheduler and instruction fetch units. Thus we add the following techniques to mitigate those side attack channels.
Rate Limiting Warp Scheduler. The GPU warp scheduler selects which warps will be issued to execute in the next cycle from a pool of all the active warps in the SM. The warps from multiple security domains can compete for the scheduling bandwidth and issue timing attacks. Our baseline warp scheduler selects the next available warps to issue based on the last issued irst and then the oldest order. When all the warps from a kernel are stalled, all the scheduling cycles will be given to the next kernel. On the other hand, if the warps from a kernel are always ready to execute, it will consume all the scheduling bandwidth and starve the other kernel. This interference in scheduling can be manipulated for timing attacks. Therefore, we enhance the warp scheduler with a rate limiter, so that scheduling cycles will be fairly distributed. For example, if one warp scheduler can issue up to two warps in each cycle, and there are two security domains, we will ensure that only one warp from each security domain can be issued. In the case of four security domains, one warp from each security domain can only be issued every other cycle.
Instruction Fetch Arbitration. Tangram prevents contention on the instruction cache using instruction fetch arbitration. A malicious kernel may intentionally saturate the instruction fetch bandwidth. Tangram alters the control unit in the L1 fetch arbiter so that it will successively fetch from diferent security domains in a round-robin manner. Therefore, each security domain gets fair access while simultaneously preventing resource hogging by a single kernel.
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Tangram Mitigating Atomic Attack: Temporal Partitioning Global memory attacks are primarily carried through atomic operations to measure contention in memory channel. When such an attack is detected by our classiier we fall back on temporal partitioning of the SM. In particular, we context switch the two malicious kernels (without perturbing the normal kernels). Since context switching is an expensive operation, we only use this option for tackling covert channels formed through atomic operations. The associated performance penalty is primarily paid by the colluding kernels, and only in very rare cases by regular kernels if they were misclassiied as colluding kernels.
Security Unit Implementation.
The various schemes described above defend against diferent types of attacks. Based on the attack classiication, the coordination across various schemes is handled using the Tangram Security Unit (TSU), shown in Figure 5 . When all the kernels are executing normally, TSU keeps all kernels in a single security domain and none of the resource partitioning schemes described above are activated. However, when the classiication algorithm detects an attack, the warp ids of the two colluding warps are sent to the TSU. TSU then activates the resource splitting across security domains. Each kernel is assigned a security domain id and all warps in that kernel execute within that security domain.
TSU maps warp IDs to security domain IDs using the Security Domain Table ( SDT). The obtained security domain ID is used as the index of Tangram Table, which tracks the resources assigned to each security domain. In this way, TSU guarantees kernels are executed in isolated security domains.
Each Tangram table entry consists of a 3-bit instruction fetch token, a 3-bit warp scheduling token, a 4-bit datapath slice mask, and a 16-bit cache utilization mode indicator. The instruction fetch token and warp scheduling token are used to determine a warp's scheduling slots out of the total scheduling cycles during a given observation window. For example, if the warp scheduling token for SD1, SD2, and SD3 are one, one, and two, respectively, and the warp scheduler can issue two warps in each cycle, then in a two cycles window, the number of warps can be issued by each of them is one warp for SD1, one warp for SD2, and two warps for SD3. To ensure fair access for diferent security domains, all the tokens will be initially set to one.
The datapath slice mask has 4 bits, each corresponding to a datapath slice (Recall that we have four datapath slices). If bit 1 of the datapath slice is cleared (set to 0) for a warp then that warp cannot be issued to datapath slice 1. Thus each warp is restricted to execute only on those slices whose corresponding bits in the datapath slice number are set to 1.
The last ield in the Tangram entry is the 16-bit cache redirection mode, which is used to provide ine grained security protection while accessing caches. In our baseline GPU there are four caches (shared memory, L1 D-Cache, constant cache, and texture cache). Each of the above four caches has a corresponding 4-bit cache redirection mask (so a total of 16-bits). When an incoming memory request is bound for a given cache type, Tangram looks up the 4-bit mask associated with that cache to determine if the request need to redirected to another cache type. For instance, if a constant cache access request from a security domain is isolated to use L1 D-cache then all requests to the constant cache will use the corresponding 4-bit mask in Tangram to initiate that redirection. Similarly if all the four bits associated with a given cache type are zero, the request traic control logic will redirect all requests from that cache type to go to the global memory (in response to a detected atomic attack). In this way, the access to caches are always going to be re-directed to the other under-utilized resources or the global memory to guarantee the execution isolation.
The TSU access latency is smaller than a clock cycle, and is of the critical path: the instruction fetch token is obtained one instruction in-advance; the warp scheduling token is retrieved in parallel with accessing the SIMT stack; the datapath slice mask and cache access mode are collected by the operand collector with other operands. The average power and area overhead of TSU are negligible compared to the entire system. Detailed analysis is presented in Section 7.4.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we discuss the experimental methodology.
Architecture
We use GPGPU-Sim v3.2.2 [8] , a cycle accurate timing simulator, in our evaluation. Our coniguration parameters are described in Table 3 . For Volta architecture, the parameters are set based on NVIDIA's white paper [5] , and HBM2 timing is set based on previous work [48] . The simulator was extended to run multiple applications concurrently, and we abide by the GPGPU-Sim model to assume that all the data fed into a kernel its in the GPU device memory. We obtained the same set of attack benchmarks from the authors in [44, 45] . Those attacks are fully validated in GPGPU-Sim against real GPU hardware, and hence our results using the GPUGPU-Sim simulation infrastructure accurately model the attacks observed in hardware.
We evaluated the performance impact of multiple defense schemes: temporal partitioning (labeled as TP in all our results), spatial partitioning through clustered SMs (labeled as SP in all our results), and GPUGuard against having Trojan and Spy kernels insecurely sharing an SM without protection. In temporal partitioning, each kernel is assigned an execution window of 50K cycles in a round robin manner. At the end of the 50K cycle window, we will preempt the current kernel and switch to the kernels in the next security domain. In clustered SM approach SMs are evenly allocated to Trojan and Spy kernels. In GPUGuard, datapath slicing, fair warp scheduling and instruction fetch are turned on for all benchmarks and for Atomic attacks GPUGuard falls back on temporal partitioning as we described earlier.
Workloads
We selected 40 readily available applications as benign samples from a collection of benchmark suites [8, 9, 47, 59] . We then extended the GPU covert channel attack applications based on attacks obtained from the authors of [44, 45] and hand-coded 250 diferent pairs (Spy and Trojan) of malicious applications, which cover atomic operation attacks (Atomic), constant cache attacks (Cache_A and Cache_B), attacks on execution units (ADD and MUL), and special functional units (SFU). These diferent attacks create orthogonal types of channels between Trojan and Spy by using diferent resources. They also difer with respect to implemented optimizations (e.g., Synchronization via handshaking through diferent cache sets [45] and Multi-bit communication), as well as the communication rate and the communicated data. Thus, the attack variants exhibit substantially diferent contention behavior. We also implemented prime-and-probe style side-channel attacks on constant cache which is run with diferent normal programs.
We split both the benign applications and attacks into separate training and testing sets, so that 60% of the benchmarks are used as training set and other benchmarks as testing set. The benchmarks are run on the GPGPU-Sim simulator [8] to collect a 24-entry feature vector for each kernel at each sampling window. Nvidia nvprof report GPU performance counter values only after each kernel termination, that is too coarse grain for our scheme. We empirically set the default window size to 1000 cycles, while providing a comparison of window sizes in Section 7.1. These feature vectors are the input to the decision tree classiier. The output is a label we assign: (0) normal application, (1) L1 cache attacks, (2) global memory attacks with atomics, (3) execution units attacks, and (4) SFU attacks.
To reduce the simulation time, a subset of the covert channel attacks is used for system evaluation: four versions for each type of attack, with various inputs, programming styles, and implemented optimization. For constant cache attacks, we evaluated both the base attacks that contend using one ixed set (Cache_A) and the improved attacks that continues to probe all the cache sets to communicate (Cache_B). To quantify the performance impact of control divergence, half of the execution unit benchmarks have little divergence, while the other half have 25% -50% of control divergence. We further run the defense schemes on 34 randomly selected, normal application pairs from the detection sets to study the performance penalty of FP predictions. The application parameters follow the benchmark sets used in [70] .
Synthesis
The decision tree based classiier and control logic of GPUGuard were designed and veriied in Verilog RTL, and synthesized with the FreePDK 45nm library [58] using the Synopsys Design Compiler [60] . FabMem [12] is used to model the security domain table and the Tangram table within the Tangram Security Unit, and also register bufers. The latency, energy, and area overheads were all taken into account.
EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate and discuss the accuracy of the attack classiier, and analyze the performance and energy impact of the proposed defense scheme to the entire system. We also report the latency, area, and power overheads of the components in the proposed GPUGuard technique. Figure 6a shows the confusion matrix. The irst column indicates the actual attack type and the last row shows the predicted attack type; attack types are numbered to match description of attacks shown in Table 1 . As shown by the strong diagonal matrix the predicted and actual attacks are close in most cases. The classiication accuracy is measured to be 93.8% with window size of 1000 cycles. The detection accuracy with window size of 5000 cycles was even higher at 97% for this experiment, but we selected 1000 cycles for faster detection.
Detection Accuracy
The accuracy is also measured using true positive (TP), false negative (FN), true negative (TN), and false positive (FP). In our results, 8.5% of regular applications were misclassiied as malicious applications (FP), but 0% malicious applications were misclassiied as regular applications (FN). FP cases cause the system to react unnecessarily (performance penalty) while FN evades detection which represents a security concern. Note that the TP rate of the classiication is 91.5% and TN rate is 100%, indicating that our detection can reliably signal a malicious behavior, and if not, the running applications are truly benign.
Covert channel attacks rely on contention on shared resources to communicate encoded messages, and the decision tree classiier takes into account many features that are related to such contention, including resource utilization, cache misses and many others. The model trains a decision tree predictor by optimally setting the thresholds of the features to detect the contention level. The structure of the decision tree model its very well with the problem we are solving, and therefore, yields a high accuracy. It must also be noted that the data set we used to build the decision tree is disjoint from the data set of benchmarks used for evaluation.
Multiple channel attack. Training and evaluation described above are performed using applications communicating over a single channel. Since we monitor performance counters that capture the contention for all cache, memory, and execution units, if the Memory Model 6MCs, GDDR5:
attacker changes its behavior to communicate over a diferent hardware resource or attempts a multiple channel attack, the contention is also detected. To get more accurate classiication, we need to add those samples to our training set with the correct label. We hand crafted a multiple channel attack that combines all four attacks listed in Table 1 . The existing scheme successfully classiied the application as an attack. To support concurrent multiple channels on diferent resources, one straightforward solution is to enable temporal partitioning, once a multiple channel attack is detected.
Comparison to neural network model detection. We implemented a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) artiicial neural network model to compare the classiication results to our decision tree based detection. In our MLP implementation the input layer contains neurons equal to the number of features (24 important features in our case), and the output layer contains neurons equal to the number of classes (ive in our case). The data is fed to the input layer of the network, and after the feed-forward propagation, the output layer of the network contains a vector of values. The neuron containing maximum value determines the class of the data. The error in prediction is calculated and using this error the weights of the network are modiied by gradient descent algorithm. The MLP based classiication accuracy is measured at 87%. Figure 6b shows the total confusion matrix which visualizes the performance of MLP classiication. Decision tree based classiication outperforms MLP in our dataset.
Robustness. We also evaluated the detector accuracy when attack kernels (Spy and Trojan) are running with normal kernels at the same time. In this situation, it is harder for the detector to accurately classify attacks due to the contention noise introduced by normal kernels. Our results show that the classiication accuracy for decision tree based and MLP based detection are 91.5% (95% with a window size of 5000) and 85.1% respectively. Figure 7 shows the total confusion matrix for these two detection schemes. To further evaluate the detection robustness, we consider the attack benchmarks that are intentionally designed to avoid detection by lowering the communication bandwidth. Speciically, we change the Spy and Trojan codes by adding extra delay between communicating two consecutive bits, to reduce the channel bandwidth by 2x, 10x up to 10 5 x. 10 5 x slow down reduces the absolute BW from 30kbps to 0.3bps for constant cache attacks. Based on our experiments, our detector accurately detects the contention when Trojan tries to send a '1' to Spy (with the same accuracy of the attacks without slowdown). On the other hand, the classiier will not detect applications as attacks in the longer idle periods (no communication), since there is no contention.
Mitigating Side Channel Attacks
Similar to covert channel scenario, in contention based side channel, a malicious application (Spy) accesses to diferent hardware resources and either measures the access time or its own performance counters to extract some information about concurrent workloads (victim) running on GPU. Due to the large number of active threads, and the relatively small cache structures, it is hard to achieve highprecision prime-probe or similar timing attacks on GPUs. In a recent work, Naghibijouybari et al. [46] demonstrated that GPU side channels are feasible by aggregate measures of contention through available GPU performance counters. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the only proposed side channel between two concurrent applications on GPU. In this subsection, we intend to evaluate our defense on this contention-based side channel. We re-implemented the CUDA-CUDA side channel attack [46] on GPGPU-Sim. In this attack, a Spy application runs concurrently with a back-propagation workload from Rodinia benchmark and extracts the number of neurons in the input layer of neural network through side channel. We collected runtime per kernel performance counters for Spy application when it is concurrently running with back-propagation algorithm with input layer size varying in the range between 64 and 65536 neurons. We trained a Random Forest classiier with 10-fold cross validation and achieved accuracy of about 70% recovering the input layer size. The performance counter set available on real GPUs through NVIDIA tools are a bit diferent than those collected on GPGPU-sim during runtime, leading to lower side channel accuracy using the simulator. Since the Spy accesses diferent hardware resources to create contention, similar to the Spy and Trojan in the detection benchmarks, can be classiied correctly as attack by our threshold-based classiier. Once the Spy has been detected as an attack, Tangram will be enabled promptly to separate the malicious Spy from other normal concurrent applications into diferent security domains. By our intra-SM isolation between two concurrent applications, we observed that the accuracy of attack signiicantly decreased obtaining essentially a random guess accuracy: Tangram was able to mitigate the attack by isolating contention between victim and spy.
Performance Impact
Figures 8a to 8c show the performance of all the defense schemes compared to intra-SM slicing without protection on NVIDIA Fermi, Kepler, and Volta architecture. For constant cache attacks, temporal partitioning (labeled TP) alone slows down program execution by at least 2.1x, while GPUGuard has signiicantly lower overhead. Clustered SM partitioning alone (labeled as SP) improves performance over temporal partitioning by 42% on average across three architectures, since it avoids kernel preemption. GPUGuard further reduces the overhead by 18% and 30% for ADD and SFU attacks over spatial partitioning. In our baseline Fermi coniguration, the initiation interval of MUL application is as long as 16 cycles, and the longer latency caused by warp folding leads to some performance penalty. However, recent generations of GPUs greatly improved the latency of matrix multiply operation, which is likely to amortize this performance penalty. Overall, GPUGuard provides robust defense across multiple attacks and incurs less than 15% overhead, only when actively defending against an ongoing attack. Considering the mitigation techniques in GPUGuard almost only turned on when there is an attack detected, the performance overhead is much smaller than simply clustering SMs all the time.
In the attack on Atomic primitives, the Trojan kernel chooses to perform Atomic operations or not to encode '1's and '0's. The Spy kernel, on the other hand, will always issue Atomic operations. The back-pressure in memory system leaks whether the Trojan kernel is sending the '1' or '0'. The Spy kernel measures the Atomic instruction latency to decode this luctuation. While concurrently executing a Trojan and Spy kernel in the same GPU amortizes the memory pressure, sharing the same SM can further reduce the congestion in load and store units. However, GPUGuard and spatial partitioning cannot close global memory channels. Since GPUGuard falls back on temporal partitioning for global memory attacks, GPUGuard's performance is the same as temporal partitioning in Figures 8a to 8c for Atomic attacks.
Overall, the geometric mean of GPUGuard's performance is 94%, 96%, and 69% faster than of temporal partitioning, and 14%, 22%, and 10% faster than spatial partitioning in Fermi, Kerpler, and Volta architecture, showing that it is possible to beneit from multiprogramming while maintaining protection against covert-channel attacks. Volta architecture has much higher HBM bandwidth, that reduces the number of warps stalled by long latency memory accesses. As we have more ready warps to schedule to execute, the protection schemes see less performance overhead. It's worth to note that, GPUGuard only incurs 8% of performance overhead against a baseline with no protection in Volta. Thus, another key beneit of intra-SM protection is system robustness. A mitigation technique with high performance penalty provides opportunity for Denial of Service attacks. By minimizing the performance slowdown, GPU-Guard also minimizes such potential security risks. Moreover both temporal partitioning and spatial partitioning require preempting the running Trojan or Spy kernel. GPUGuard partitions the resources within a core, and does not incur preemption overhead. Finally, GPUGuard triggers defense only when attack is detected, thus has no overhead when there are no attacks detected.
Impact of False Positives. FP cases are rare. Nonetheless, we further study the performance impact of those cases when normal kernels are inaccurately classiied as malicious in Volta. As shown in Figure 8d , temporal partitioning incurs 77% slowdown, spatial partitioning incurs 42% slowdown, while GPUGuard reduces that to only 15%. GPUGuard beneits the most for kernels that are memory + compute case, when complimentary sharing inside one SM is favored, and the least for compute + compute case, when datapath slicing reduced the opportunity for complimentary compute operation to share pipeline cycles.
Hardware Overhead
GPUGuard requires 24 performance counters for sampling the selected features for threat detection (each 10 bits), once every 1000 cycles. Among those, 10 counters, including the SP − I NT , SP − F P, SFU issued counters, the SP −F P, SFU , and LD/ST utilization counters, L1C and L2 accesses and misses counters, are already provided in the modern GPUs [4] . The V100 clock rate is 1.53GHz and the required sampling bandwidth is 45.9MB/s, negligible compared to the 900GB/s of-chip memory bandwidth.
The data collected by the counters are fed into the decision tree classiier. Synthesis results show that the classiier consumes 0.21mW per detection with 0.62ns latency. Since the classiication is not on the performance critical path, the one cycle latency does not afect the overall system performance. The area overhead of the classiier is 0.001mm 2 , which is small compared to the die area. Tangram security units require 22.5B RAM for keeping track of the security domain IDs and scheduling information. As described in Section 5, our datapath slicing design simply folds a warp and has low hardware overhead. Diferent from a full-blown variable sized warp architecture, proposed by Rogers et al. [56] , our design does not require any modiication to the interconnection network between the register banks and the data pipeline. To support our datapath slicing, 128B register bufers and four multiplexers/demultiplexers (32-bit width) are required per SM. The latency, power, and area overheads are broken down in Table 4 . The area overhead is 0.1mm 2 per SM. Based on the activity factors collected by the timing simulator, the average power of the added hardware is 8.3mW per SM. We extract area and average power of 16 SMs from GPU-Wattch [33] , which are 704mm 2 and 73W , respectively. GPUGuard results in 0.2% area overhead for GPUs with 16 SMs. The total power consumption was 0.18% of the overall system power.
RELATED WORK
Microarchitectural covert-channel and side-channel attacks have been widely studied on diferent resources on CPUs [20, 28, 32, 39, 41, 53, 63, 72] . There are many defense proposals to close side channel attacks on the CPUs which mostly focus on caches and memory controllers. These proposals include: (1) Static or dynamic partitioning of resources like L1 cache [15, 21, 50, 55] that can introduce unacceptable performance overhead and can only support a limited number of partitions with reasonable overhead and mitigation mechanisms like locking the critical cache lines with the support of OS and compiler [31, 64] . Liu et al. [37] proposes partitioning the LLC into secure and non-secure partitions and line locking the secure partition for defeating side channels. (2) Randomizing memory-to-cache mapping, including randomization in the replacement of the cache lines in the entire cache [65] and in the cache ill strategy [38] . (3) Adding noise to timing by manipulating time measurement structure of processor [40] . (4) Traic control in memory controllers [57, 62] . Such defenses do not transit directly to GPUs or to covert channels. Our solution uses GPU-appropriate forms of partitioning triggered by detection of covert communication. We note that covert channels are more diicult to defend against than side-channels, so we expect that our defense will also defend against concurrent kernel execution based side-channel attacks if those are possible.
Online detection of contention based covert communication is an alternative that is useful for closing covert channels. Chen et al. [10] present a framework to detect timing covert channel on shared hardware resources on a CPU by dynamically monitoring conlict patterns between processes. However, their framework is designed to detect alternating pattern of cache conlicts between Spy and Trojan and not to detect any variations of the attackÐthose channels that access to other shared resources concurrently. Yan et al. [71] propose a record and deterministic replay framework. It detects timing attacks by replaying execution on a diferent cache coniguration to detect contention only on caches. In contrast, our solution monitors contention on all known resources as it occurs. There are also a number of online detection schemes based on hardware performance counters [14, 29, 49] . Unlike these prior solutions that only focus on malware detection, GPUGuard also provides mitigation solutions for preventing information leakage through covert channels.
Jiang et al. [24] present an architectural timing attack from the CPU to the GPU. The attack triggers an AES computation on the GPU, and times it showing that there exists correlation the measured time (which varies due to key dependent memory coalescing behavior) and the last round key in AES encryption. Recently, Kadam et al. [26] propose sub-warp randomization techniques to alleviate such correlation-based timing attacks by making the relationship between execution time and coalesced memory accesses less predictable. Jiang et al. present another timing side channel [25] based on correlation between execution time of one table lookup of a warp and a number of bank conlicts generated by threads within the warp. These attack are substantially diferent from our attacks with a diferent threat model. The attacks we protect against construct contention based covert channels between two malicious applications running concurrently. The defense proposed by Kadam et al. (which does not afect our attacks), can be combined with ours for protection against both types of attacks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose GPUGuard, a dynamic detection and defense mechanism against covert channel attacks. The detection uses a decision tree based design that is able to accurately detect covertand side-channel attacks (100% sensitivity in our experiments). The detection algorithm feeds the classiication results to Tangram, a GPU-speciic covert channel elimination scheme. Tangram uses a combination of warp folding, pipeline slicing, and cache remapping mechanisms to close the channels with 8%-23% performance overhead when there are active attacks, and 15% for normal benchmarks categorized as attacks with only a small (8.5%) false positive rate. In all other cases GPUGuard pays nearly zero performance overhead.
